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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
JERRY LYNN MARSHALL, ] 
Defendant/Appellant ] 
> Appellate Court # 20020829 
I Priority: Defendant Incarcerated 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT QF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over a final order or decree resulting from 
adjudicated proceedings in the district court, pursuant to Utah Code Sec. 78-2a-3(2¥a\ 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue for review is whether the State can charge Defendant with a third degree felony 
pursuant to Utah Code Sec, 41-6-44)6))a) based on two (2) prior convictions for Driving Under 
the Influence of Alcohol which violations occurred on August 21, 1998, and on December 30, 
1994, without violating UCA Sec. 68-3-3. and the ex post facto and due process provisions of the 
United States Constitution and the Constitution of Utah. 
The standard of review by this Court is to review the trial court's factual findings for 
clear error and its conclusions of law for correctness. State v. Pooler. 456 Utah Adv.27. 
-1-
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES. 
Utah Code Sec. 41-6-44 0990): 
(6)(a) A third or subsequent conviction within six years under this section 
or under a local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance 
with Subsection 41-6-43(1) is a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor if one or both of the prior convictions for an 
offense committed prior to April 23, 1990, and 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the prior convictions are for 
offenses committed after April 23, 1990. 
(7)(a) A fourth or subsequent conviction within six years under this section 
is a third degree felony if all three prior convictions are for offenses 
committed after April 23, 1990. 
Utah Code Sec, 41-6-44(1993) 
(6)(a) A third conviction for a violation committed within six years of two \ 
prior violations under this section is a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in Subsection (ii) and (7) 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the prior convictions are for violations 
committed after April 23, 1990. 
(7)(a) A fourth or subsequent conviction for a violation under this section is a 
third degree felony only if at least three prior convictions are for violations 
committed after April 23, 1990 
Utah Code Sec. 41-6-44 (1996) 
(6)(a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within 
six years of two or more prior convictions under this section is a: 
(1) class A misdemeanor, except as provided in Subsection (ii), and 
(ii) third degree felony if at least: 
(A) three prior convictions are for violations committed 
after April 23, 1990, or 
(B) two prior convictions are for violations committed 
after July 1, 1996. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v
-
Mario A. Soto, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
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Case No. 20020328-CA 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Jerry Lynn Marshall, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 20020829-CA 
The above captioned cases are before the court on a 
stipulated motion to consolidate the appeals for purposes of oral 
argument. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to consolidate is 
granted and the above captioned cases shall be consolidated oral 
argument. 
Dated this c^yday of February, 2003. 
FOR THE COURT: 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Mario A. Soto, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
JAN 0 3 2003 
Paulette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
ORDER 
Case No. 20020328-CA 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Jerry Lynn Marshall, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 20020829-CA 
The above captioned cases are before the court on a 
stipulated motion to consolidate the appeals for purposes of oral 
argument. Briefing has not yet been completed in either case. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a ruling on the motion to 
consolidate the appeals for oral argument is deferred until the 
briefs in each case have been submitted to the court. 
Dated this y7 day of January, 2003 
FOR THE COURT: 
Nornfan H. Jack^ 
P r e s i d i n g Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on January 8, 2003, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to 
the parties listed below: 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
MARGRET SIDWELL TAYLOR 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
147 S MAIN ST 
HELPER UT 84526 
Dated this January 8, 2003. 
By/^Lt/y~ Al/jL/a^J!^ ) 
Deputy C l e r k ' / 
Ca&e No. 20020328 & 20020829 
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FOR THE COURT: 
Nornfan H. J a c k e d , 
Presiding Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on January 8, 2003, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to 
the parties listed below: 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
MARGRET SIDWELL TAYLOR 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
147 S MAIN ST 
HELPER UT 84526 
Dated this January 8, 2003. 
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Utah Cote Sw. 41-6-44 (2000) 
(6)(a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six years 
of two or more prior convictions under this section is a third degree felony. 
Utah Code Sec. 41-6-44 (2001) 
(6)(a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony 
if it is committed: 
(i)within ten years of two or more prior convictions under this section, or 
(ii) at any time after a conviction of: 
(A) automobile homicide under Sec. 76-5-207 that is committed 
after July 1,2001, or 
(B) a felony violation under this section that is committed 
after July 1,2001 
Utah Code Sec. 68-3-3: 
No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared. 
Constitution of the Unites States. 
Sec. 9 (3): No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed. 
Amendment V: No person shall...shall not be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law. 
Constitution of the State of Utah. 
Sec. 18: No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing obligation of 
contracts shall be passed. 
Sec. 7 :No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without 
due process of law. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
FACTS OF THE CASE 
The parties stipulated to the facts in this case. 
The trial court set forth the stipulated facts as follows: 
1. Sergeant Gayle Jensen of the Emery County Sheriffs Department observed the 
defendant purchasing a 12 -pack of beer at BK's in Huntington, Utah, on 
April 26, 2002. 
2. It appeared to Sergeant Jensen that the defendant was intoxicated and told 
him that he should not drive. He also suggested to the defendant that he should 
call a friend to come and pick him up. 
3. The defendant placed a phone call and Sergeant Jensen left the premises. 
However, Sergeant Jensen soon decided to return to BK's to make sure the 
defendant did not attempt to drive away. 
4. Upon arriving at BK;s, the sergeant observed the defendant drive away. The 
officer stopped the defendant and conducted field sobriety tests which led the 
officer concluding that the defendant was intoxicated. The defendant was arrested 
and given an intoxylizer test which test yielded a reading of .25. An open 
container was also found in the defendant's vehicle. R. 54-55 
The State submitted two (2) prior DUI arrest and conviction dates as follows: 
Arrest date: December 30, 1994, and conviction date of December 19, 1995 R.55 
Arrest date: August 21, 1998, and conviction date of September 22, 1998 R.55. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant does not argue that the 2001 DUI law is per se unconstitutional. 
Defendant argues that as applied to him based on his two (2) prior DUI violations which 
occurred on December 30, 1994 and and August 21, 1998 and convictions on December 19, 1995 
and September 22, 1998, respectively are violations or his Constitutional rights, particularly the 
due process clauses and the ex post facto prohibitions. 
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TRIAL COURT RULING 
The court rejected defendant's claim that the 2001 amendment to the DUI law represents 
an ex post fact law as applied to defendant R.55 
The court held that the 2001 amendment "merely provides that prior convictions may be 
used for the purpose of enhancing the seriousness of the the instant charge." R.55 
The court held that the 2001 amendment "does not affect the status of the previous 
offenses or convictions and does not increase the severity or the penalty." R.55 
The court held that the 2001 DUI law "doesn't punish against a former crime, but for the 
present offense gives a more severe penalty because of the prior convictions. R.56 
The court cited the United States Supreme Court case of Gyger v. Burke. 384 US 728 for 
the proposition that "habitual criminal" laws are not ex post facto laws, R. 56 
The court held that the 2001 DUI law does not violate due process by failing to place the 
defendant on notice that the prior convictions could be used for enhancement purposes, and that 
defendant was on notice as the effective date of the 2001 amendment, July 1,2001, and that if 
defendant committed a DUI after that date, the charge could be enhanced by any DUI convictions 
within a 10 year period prior to the latest offense. R.56 
The trial court held that defendant had almost ten months notice of the enhancement 
provision, and that the notice was "fair warning", which "satisfies the requirement of due process 
by giving adequate notice of the 2001 amendment." R.56 
The trial court dismissed UCA 68-3-3 and held that "this section does not govern this 
case." And, the court held that Sec. 68-3-3 was enacted in 1953 at the time the entire Utah 
Code was revised and was meant to apply to those revisions. The court found that even if the 
section does apply, the ten year provision is an express provision creating "retroactivity". R.56 
The trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss the third degree felony charge. R.56 
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Defendant entered a conditional plea of "no contest", with the agreement of counsel for 
the State and the trial court judge, on the condition that if the decision is in favor of the State, the 
plea will stand, and if the Court rules in favor of defendant, the case will be remanded to the trial 
court for sentencing on a Class B misdemeanor DUI. R. 62-64. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The issue in this appeal is where along the time line should this Court place the ten-year 
time period during which a defendant can be charged with a third degree felony based on two (2) 
prior convictions of DUI, pursuant to UCA Sec. 44-6-44 (6)(aVl) (2001) 
STATUTORY ARGUMENT 
The evolution of the Utah DUI laws in the last ten (10) years is a riddle, the resolution of 
which is somewhat akin to working a crossword puzzle and a jigsaw puzzle, while playing chess 
and rowing a canoe. 
Defendant wall review the evolution of the DUI laws from 1990 to 2001,with particular 
focus on the number of violations, the dates of the violations, and the particular DUI law in effect 
at the time of each violation. Defendant will argue that the "time-line" begins on July 1,1996, and 
continues prospectively for ten (10) years. 
CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT 
The Constitution of the United States and the Utah Constitution have prohibitions 
against ex post fact laws. Similarly, both documents provide that "no person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty or property without due process of law." 
Defendant will argue that the ex post facto laws and the due process clauses of both 
Constitutions prohibit a violation and conviction for DUI prior to July 1, 1996, from being used 
to enhance the present DUI 
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ANALYSIS AND ARGUMENT 
STATUTORY LAWS 
The 1996 amendments to the DUI law added for the first the time a third degree felony 
DUI charge if a defendant had two prior DUI convictions for violations committed after July L 
1996. 
DUI laws since the July 1,1996 date after which violations must have occurred have not 
been amended. The third degree charge, the number of violations, or the date of the violation 
have not been amended. 
The only amendment to the 2001 DUI law is the addition of the provision increasing the 
time frame from the previous six (6) year period to a ten (10) year period. 
No other amendments of the DUI statutes since the July 1,1996 date has referred to a 
date after which "convictions for violations are committed'. Defendant argues that since there is 
no subsequent amendment regarding the date after which "convictions for violations are 
committed" that the default is July 1,1996. 
The 2000 DUI amendments provided simply: "A third or subsequent conviction 
committed within six years of two or more convictions under this section is a third degree 
felony."The 2000 DUI statute is devoid of any reference to a specific date after which 
"convictions for violations are committed " . The default is. July 1, 1996. 
The major change in the 2001 amendments to the DUI law is the addition of the ten (10) 
year time frame. But, the 2001 DUI statute, under which defendant is being prosecuted in this 
case, lacks any reference to the date after which "convictions for violations are committed". 
Defendant again argues that the default is the 1996 DUI statute, i.e. July 1,1996. 
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UCA Sec. 68-3-3 provides that "(N)o part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless 
expressly so declared. 
The retroactive prohibitions of of UCA Sec. 68-3-3 will be avoided if the Court holds 
that the 2001 DUI amendment providing for a ten (10) year time-frame is simply an extension of 
the previous six (6) year time frame which began on July L 1996 
Defendant argues that the ten (10) year "time line" must begin on July 1, 1996, and 
apply prospectively for ten (10) years, and continuing thereafter until repealed or amended. 
Defendant admits that his August 1, 1998 violation which resulted in a conviction on 
September 22, 1998, is within the ten (10) year "time-line" beginning July 1,1996. 
However, Defendant argues that his violation on December 30, 1994, and conviction of 
DUI on December 19, 1995, is prior to the July 1,1996 amendments, and therefore, cannot be 
the basis of an enhancement of the charge from a Class B misdemeanor to a third degree felony. 
The Constitutional ex post facto and due process implications will need not be considered 
if this Court holds that the ten (10) year addition of the 2002 DUI amendment merely extends 
the prior six (6) year time frame prospectively to a ten (10) year time frame beginning from the 
previous date of July 1, 1996 
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CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
Are the changes in the DUI law which came into effect on July 1, 2001, as applied to this 
Defendant, violations of the Due Process Clause and the ex post facto clause of the Constitution 
of the United States and contrary to the Laws of Utah? 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
In 1954, Justice Warren wrote the opinion in the case of United States v. Harriss. 347 
U.S. 612, and pronounced what has become a basic tenant of the criminal law: 
The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal 
statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that 
his conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that 
no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not 
reasonably understand to be proscribed. Id. 617 
The Harris case is quoted with favor in the 1964 case of Bouie v. City of Columbia. 
378 U.S. 347, by Justice Brennen: 
The basic principle that a criminal statute must give fair warning of the 
conduct that makes it a crime has often been recognized by this Court. 
Citing U.S. v Harris. Supra. 
Justice Brennen continues: 
"Thus we have struck down a state criminal statute under the Due Process 
Clause where it was not 'sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject 
to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to it's penalties. 
We have recognized in such cases that 'a statute which either forbids or 
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, 
violates the first essential of due process of law' Id. 
-9-
In 1981 the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Weaver v. Graham. 450 U.S. 
24, and granted relief to petitioner on the grounds that the Florida statute was unconstitutional as 
an ex post facto law as applied to petitioner. Justice Marshall wrote the opinion and defined the 
criteria for an ex post facto violation. 
For a criminal or penal law to be ex post facto, it must be retrospective , that it 
must apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage 
the offender affected by it. 
Justice Marshall continued: 
Critical to relief under the Ex Post Facto Clause is not an individual's right 
to less punishment, but the lack of fair notice and government restraint when 
the legislature increase punishment beyond what was proscribed when the 
crime was consummated. 
Thus, even if a statute merely alters the penal provisions accorded by the 
grace of the legislature, it violates the Clause if it is both retrospective and 
more onerous than the law in effect on the date of the offense. 
Black's Law Dictionary (4th Edition, 1957) at P. 662-663 defines "ex post facto" law as 
"A law passed after the occurrence of a fact or commission of an act, which 
retrospectively changes the legal consequences, or relations of such fact or deed." 
Black's cites the following examples of prohibited ex post facto laws: 
"A statute which changes punishment which may be imposed for a crime 
theretofore committed is ' ex post facto' only if it prescribes or permits 
imposition of a greater sentence." 
"An 'ex post facto' law aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when 
it was committed. 
"An * ex post facto' law is one which makes an act punishable in a manner to 
to which it was not punishable when it was committed, or which deprives 
accused of any substantial right or immunity possessed by him before the 
passage as to the prior offense." 
-10-
"...the legislature shall not pass any law, after a fact done by the citizen, 
which shall have relation to that fact, so as to punish that which was innocent 
when done, or add to the punishment of that which was criminal, or to increase 
the malignity of a crime..." 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has had occasion four (4) times in the last two years 
to consider various aspects of "ex post facto" claims. Following are excerpts from the cases 
which define the meaning of and requirements for holding that a law is or is not "ex post facto". 
The 10th Circuit Court discussed "ex post facto" laws in the case of Barnes v. Scott 
decided on January 24,2000, Case # 98-6085, as follows: 
"The focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not whether a legislative change 
produces some ambiguous sort of "disadvantage" (to covered offenders)., 
.but on whether such change alters the definition of criminal conduct or 
increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable." 
The Tenth Circuit Court discussed the Ex Post Facto Clause in the case of Smith v. Scott. 
decided August 22, 2000, Case No.00-6021. The Court stated: 
"When the current interpretation of a statute is foreseeable, there can be no Ex Post Facto 
Clause violation." 
The Tenth Circuit Court cited Bouie v. City of Colombia. 378 U.S. 347, 352-53, which 
applied the forseeability as a test of the principle underlying the ' ex post facto' clause. 
The Tenth Circuit Court also cited the United States Supreme Court case of Weaver v. 
Graham 450 US. 24, wherein the Supreme Court held that "lack of fair notice" is a critical 
element in obtaining ex post facto relief. 
The Tenth Circuit in deciding the case of Femedeer v. Haun on August 28, 2000, Case 
Nos. 99-4082 and 99-4093 cited the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. 
"No... ex post facto Law shall be passed." 
-11-
The Court continued: 
"Among those laws prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause are those that "make more 
burdensome the punishment for a crime, after it's commission." citing Collins v. Youngblood, 
497 U.S. 37,42. 
The Tenth Circuit again considered a claim of violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause in the 
case of Henderson v. Scott, decided August 31,2001, Case No.00-6374. 
Regarding the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Court stated: 
The United States Constitution prohibits States from passing any "ex post facto Law". 
This Clause "is aimed at laws that retroactively alter the definition of crimes of 
increase the punishment for criminal acts. 
Two critical elements must be present for a law to fall within the ex post facto 
prohibition: first, the law must be retrospective, that is, is must apply to events 
occurring before its enactment; and second, it must disadvantage the offender 
affected by it. Citing Cal. Dept of Corrections v Morales. 514 U.S. 499, 504 (1995), 
and Miller v. Florida. 482 U.S. 423, 423 (1987) 
ANALYSIS AND ARGUMENT 
A criminal prosecution begins with an arrest. The second step is filing the charge in an 
Information advising the defendant of the charges against him. The third step is either a 
conviction or an acquittal. And, in the event of a conviction, the next step is the imposition of 
the penalty. 
The change in the 2001 DUI law which became effective July 1,2001,could not only alter 
the penalty, but alter the charge, both to the detriment of Defendant. . 
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The 1996 DUI statute, Section 41-6-44(6)(a)(A), Utah Code Annotatedprovided notice to 
Defendant and all others that a third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within 
six (6) years of two or more prior convictions could be charged as a Class A misdemeanor, and, 
could be charged as a third degree felony, if at least three prior convictions are for violations 
committed after April 23, 1990, or two prior convictions for violations committed after July 1, 
1996. 
Defendant's 1994 conviction occurred prior to the implementation of the 1996 statute, 
which statute specifically refers to "two prior convictions for violations committed after July L 
1996.". This Defendant did not, at the time of the violation or conviction in 1994, have the 
necessary notice of the enhancement to a third degree felony which was later specified in the 
1996 DUI law. 
Defendant did have notice in 1998 prior to his DUI violation and subsequent conviction 
as provided by the 1996 statute, but the 1998 violation and conviction was the only offense 
within the six (6) year time frame set forth in the 1996 statute which began on July 1,1996. 
Defendant's present offense, along with his 1998 DUI conviction, puts this offense in the 
category of a Class B Misdemeanor, as a second violation within the six year time frame set forth 
in the 1996 Statute. 
Defendant is charged in this case with a third degree felony based on the 2001 change in 
the DUI statute which directs that the charge be based on two (2) or more prior DUI convictions 
under the statute within ten (10) years. Defendant disputes the third degree felony charge on the 
grounds of due process and ex post facto violations. 
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At issue are the 2001 changes in the law which provides that the charge is a third degree 
felony if a defendant has two prior convictions within ten (10) years and/or with a prior felony 
conviction, even though both occurred prior to the implementation of the 2001 DUI Law. But, in 
neither instance could Defendant had known prior to the DUI Law of 2001 that the legislature 
would change the law and increase the charges in both cases. 
According to Justice Warren in the Harris case, supra, 
"The Constitutional requirement of defmiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails 
to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his conduct is forbidden by the 
statute. " 
Defendant or any other person of ordinary intelligence could not have, even with the 
wildest of guesses, foreseen that in the year 2001 the Utah State Legislature would pass a law by 
which his 1993 and 1994 convictions would be used to enhance this charge to a third degree 
felony. 
Justice Brennen and the Court in the Harris case held that the Due Process Clause could 
be the basis for striking down a state criminal statute where it was not "sufficiently explicit to 
inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to it's 
penalties." 
Defendant's right to due process, i.e. notice of the consequences of any future violation, 
was not conveyed to him, and with this prosecution his right to due process has been violated. 
Justice Marshall, writing for he United States Supreme Court in Weaver v. Graham 
defined the criteria for relief under the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution, as 
follows: 
For a criminal or penal law to be ex post facto, it must be retrospective, 
that it must apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it must 
disadvantage the offender affected by it. 
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Critical to relief under the Ex Post Facto Clause is not an individual's 
right to less punishment, but the lack of fair notice and government 
restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was 
proscribed when the crime was committed, id. 
In the case at bar, the 2001 DUI statute appears to retrospectively set forth a time 
period often (10) years, and and that applies to an event which occurred prior to the enactment 
of the present statute. 
The 2001 version of the DUI statute, implies that the violations and convictions can be 
applied retrospectively, and changes the legal consequences to a defendant in relation to 
previous convictions. 
In truth, the only new amendment to the 2001 DUI statute increased the time for which 
this statute will apply from six (6) years to ten (10) years, but is silent on the question of when 
the ten years begins and ends. 
The Tenth Circuit Court in Barnes v. Scott held: 
The focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not whether a legislative change 
produces some ambiguous soft of'disadvantage' (to covered offenders) 
but on whether the change alters the definition of criminal conduct or 
increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable. 
The change in the 2001 DUI law alters the definition of criminal conduct and increases the 
penalty for which a violation is punishable. The charge becomes a third degree felony and the 
penalty becomes a prison term of from zero to five years in prison. 
On June 30, 2001, the day before the 2001 DUI law became effective, the DUI Code 
provided that a third or subsequent violation committed within six (6) years of two or more prior 
convictions under this section to be a third degree felony. This prior DUI law has been on the 
books since 1996, and gave notice to all potential violators of its consequences. 
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The 1996 DUI law provided that a third or subsequent conviction committed within six 
years of two or more prior convictions was a Class A Misdemeanor, and a third degree felony if 
there were three prior convictions for violations committed after April 23,1990, and two prior 
convictions for violations committed after July 1, 1996. 
However, in 2001, the State in this case attempted to expand the retroactive time period 
from six (6) years to ten (10) years, and in effect, increase the charge and the penalty, and to 
punish an act which occurred not six (6) years earlier, but ten (10) years earlier. 
The 2001 DUl law became effective on July 1, 2001, and attempts to make the charge a 
third degree felony if a conviction for a violation is committed within ten (10) years of two or 
more prior convictions. The legislature conveniently omitted the date from which notice was 
given, i.e. July L 1996.. 
The 2001 legislature could have simply added the default date of, July 1. 1996. and 
provided that the violations and convictions outlined in the statute be prospective, rather than 
retrospective. 
A conviction for a violation of the DUI statute can still be a third degree felony if it is 
committed within ten (10) years, but limited to prospective, and not to retroactive violations 
committed prior to July 1. 1996. 
The result would be to phase in the ten (10) year provision over a period of years 
beginning with July 1,1996.. The inclusion the effective date of the statute as set forth in the 
1996 DUl amendments would cure the Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clause proliibitions found 
in this present legislation. 
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As it stands now, the 2001 DUI legislature has attempted to created and the State is 
attempting to implement an ex post facto law, which is specifically prohibited by the Ex Post 
Facto Clause and the Due Process of the Constitution of the United States, and unconstitutional 
as applied to this Defendant. 
This attempt by the legislature to enact these changes in the 2001 DUI law fails on other 
grounds set forth herein, and specifically the prohibition found in Utah Code Annotated Section 
68-3-3 which states in pertinent part: "No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless 
expressly so declared." There is no such expression declared in this legislation. 
In the recent case of State v. Daniels. 438 Utah Adv. Rep. 12. the Utah Supreme Court 
cited the United States Supreme Court case of Collins vs. Youngbloodr 497 U.S. 37 (1990) as 
follows: 
...one function of the Ex Post Facto Clause is to bar enactments which, by retroactive 
operation, increase the punishment for a crime after its commission. Id at 249-250. 
The recent case of State v. Lusk. 2001 UT 102, decided on December 7,2001, is 
instructive in the case at bar, particularly that part which sets forth the criteria regarding the 
retroactive application of a statute. The Court spoke to the issue of retroactive legislation: 
We hold that a statutory amendment enlarging a statute of limitation wall extend the 
limitations period applicable to a crime already committed only if the amendment 
becomes effective before the previous applicable statute of limitations has run, 
thereby barring prosecution of the crime. 
The Court continued: 
...a legislative enactment extending a statute of limitations will not be retroactively 
applied to a crime committed if prosecution of that crime would already be precluded 
by the running of the previously applicable statute of limitations. 
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In the case at bar, Defendant has prior convictions for DUI in 1998, and 1994. The 1998 
DUI conviction is relevant here only as the basis for this case to be a second DUI offense. The 
1998 conviction is the only conviction of this Defendant which occurred after the change in the 
1996 DUI law. Defendant and all others became aware that a third conviction for violation of the 
DUI Law within six (6) years when committed after July 1. 1996. can be enhanced to a third 
degree felony. 
This Court should find that the 1994 conviction for an violation of the DUI law occurred 
prior to the enactment of the 1996. The Court should find that the 1994 DUI conviction of this 
defendant is no longer available for use as an enhancement to a third degree felony because it 
occurred prior to July 1, 1996, and the use of this conviction to enhance the charge of DUI to a 
third degree felony would be a violation of the due process clauses and the ex post facto clauses 
of the Constitution of the State of Utah and the Constitution of the United States. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that this Court dismiss the third degree felony charge of 
Driving Under the Influence in this case, and 
Defendant prays that the Court remand the case to the district court for the imposition of 
sentence for a Class B misdemeanor 
DATED THIS J Y? day of 
IGKE1 SIpWELL TAYLOR 
Attorney for Defendant 
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DU1 STATUTES FROM 1990 TO 2001 
UCA 41-6-44 (1990) 
(6)(a) A third or subsequent conviction within six years under this section ...is a 
(i) class B misdemeanor if one or both of the prior convictions is for an 
offense committed prior to April 23,1990; and 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the prior convictions are for offenses 
committed after April 23, 1990. 
UCA 41-6-44 (1991) 
(6) (a) A third or subsequent conviction within six years of two prior violations 
under this section... is a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in Subsections (6) (a) (ii) 
and (7); and 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the prior convictions are for violations 
committed after April 23,1990. 
UCA 41-6-44 (1992) 
(6) (a) A third conviction for a violation committed within six years of two prior 
violations under this section...is a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in Subsections (6) (a) (ii) 
and (7); and 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the prior convictions are for violations 
committed after April 23,1990. 
UCA 41-6-44 (1993) 
(6) (a) A third conviction for a violation committed within six years of two prior 
violations under this section is a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in Subsections (ii) and (7); 
and 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the prior convictions are for violations 
committed after April 23,1990. 
i 
UCA 41-6-44 (1994) 
(6) (a) A third conviction for a violation committed within six years of two prior 
violations under this section is a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in Subsections (ii) and (7); 
and 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the prior convictions are for violations 
committed after April 23, 1990. 
UCA 41-6-44 (1995) 
(6) (a) A third conviction for a violation committed within six years of two prior 
violations under this section is a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in Subsections (ii) and (7); 
and 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the prior convictions are for violations 
committed after April 23, 1990. 
UCA 41-6-44 (1996) 
(6) (a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six 
years of two or more prior convictions under this section is a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in Subsection (ii); and 
(ii) third degree felony if at least: 
(A) three prior convictions are for violations committed after April 
23, 1990; or 
(B) two prior convictions are for violations committed after July 1, 
1996. 
UCA 41-6-44 (1997) 
(6) (a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six 
years of two or more prior convictions under this section is a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in Subsection (6) (a) (ii); 
and 
(ii) third degree felony if at least: 
(A) three prior convictions are for violations committed after April 
23,1990; or 
(B) two prior convictions are for violations committed after July 1, 
1996. 
ii 
3UCA 41-6-44 (1998) 
(6) (a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six 
years of two or more prior convictions under this section is a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in Subsection (6) (a) (ii); 
and 
(ii) third degree felony if at least: 
(A) three prior convictions are for violations committed after April 
23,1990; or 
(B) two prior convictions are for violations committed after July 1, 
1996. 
UCA 41-6-44 (1999) 
(6) (a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six 
years of two or more prior convictions under this section is a third degree 
felony. 
UCA 41-6-44 (2000) 
(6) (a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six 
years of two or more prior convictions under this section is a third degree 
felony. 
UCA 41-6-44 (2001) 
(6) (a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony if it is 
committed: 
(i) within 10 years of two or more prior convictions under this section; or 
(ii) at any time after a conviction of: 
(A) automobile homicide under 
(B) a felony violation under this section that is committed after July 
1,2001. 
iii 
